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Many animal rights activists agree that pain is universally felt, spanning human-animal barriers to encompass all
living, or embodied, things. Elizabeth Costello, the aging
female novelist central to J. M. Coetzee’s novella, utilizes a
series of metaphors in her lecture The Philosophers and the
Animals to compare animal suffering to human suffering.
Coetzee uses the character of Costello as a lens for addressing
the ethical boundaries of horror and what it means to not only
be cognizant of immense suffering, but to willfully ignore
“places of death” as an entire community.1 I will explore the
ethical boundary between human suffering and animal cruelty
as seen in the metaphors presented by Coetzee’s Costello in her
first lecture, The Philosophers and the Animals: the comparison
of the meat industry to the Third Reich, and mass animal
slaughter to the Nazi death camps. It is too reductionist to claim
that Costello is a stand-in for Coetzee, yet they share similar
life experiences and a pessimistic outlook on the ability of
society to progress. The latter distances himself from his own
beliefs by utilizing fictional interlocutors, allowing for an
expansive examination of the multiplicities inherent in hege-

1

J. M. Coetzee, The Lives of Animals (New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1999), 35.

Furman Humanities Review
monic evaluations of suffering, the nonpower inherent in
power.2
Is it ethical, from a philosophical standpoint as well as
a literary one, to draw upon the horrors of the Holocaust in a
metaphor referencing the mass slaughter of animals? Are there
specific moments in history that are too appalling and deeply
personal to ever appropriately use as a point of comparison in a
contemporary argument? Coetzee clearly takes the issue of
human mistreatment of animals seriously, as his protagonist’s
chosen metaphorics equate human cruelty towards animals with
the calculated murder of millions of Jews in the Holocaust.
Coetzee presented his pseudo-lecture, the novella itself, at the
1997-98 Tanner Lectures at Princeton University, both revealing and veiling his opinions on the way human beings treat
animals in our capitalistic society.3 Through Costello’s chosen
metaphors, we see Coetzee’s own moral opprobrium with the
meat industry, as well as his understanding of how audiences,
representative of society in microcosm, perceive and respond to
his arguments. The comparison between the victims of fascism
and factory farms is not inherently objectionable when in the
form of a literary device, solely because figurative devices in
literature do not carry a burden of proof. They are meant to
illustrate an idea, not substantiate it. It is too simple to claim
that the comparison lessens the tragedy of the Holocaust and
the pain felt; in fact, this line of reasoning precludes the
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acknowledgment that animals have souls and can thus suffer.
However, what metrics exist for measuring the ethical applicability of figurative language, the level of sensitivity surrounding
historically charged words and phrases? In what ways does
Coetzee himself escape culpability because he presents the
comparison through the words of a fictional lecturer?
Costello’s metaphor in her lecture The Philosophers
and Animals, while controversial, aptly illuminates the tragedy
of the meat industry. It helps underline the gravity of how
humans oppress nonhuman animals and escape culpability.
However, one reason Costello’s metaphor is so shocking—and
can be argued insensitive—is because she does not assure her
audience of the ways in which her comparison could be
perceived as offensive. She fails to address the ways in which
history integrates itself into present discussions, so that the
Holocaust is not less important because it happened in the past
and cannot be reconciled (as the meat industry of the present
day can.) Her fatal flaw is in replacing an equal sign with a
greater than sign, claiming that the meat industry is worse than
what the Third Reich unrolled. She states that “an enterprise of
degradation, cruelty, and killing” exists that “rivals anything
that the Third Reich was capable of, indeed dwarfs it” (21).4
However, Costello does not discomfit her audience because this correlation is ungrounded, or because she does not
qualify her subject matter enough. Rather, Costello’s lecture
makes her audience uncomfortable because it “breaks with the
expected academic norms” thus provoking “awkward emotional
exchanges” as pointed out by Frances Mascia-Lees, an American anthropologist.5 We can see this in the decisive letter
Abraham Stern, a professor at Appleton College, sends to
Costello, calling her out for trading “on the horrors of the
camps in a cheap way” and insulting “the memory of the dead”
4
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(50).6 Coetzee presents us with a protagonist who addresses her
audience directly, claiming no pretense. She deviates from
polite conversation with an apology that sounds much more like
an indictment, asking her audience to “pardon the tastelessness
of the following” before theorizing about the body fat of
Treblinka’s victims being used as in ingredient in soap (2122).7 We are so shocked by her words that we cannot process
the greater meaning behind them. The metaphor falls flat.
From a historical point of view, Costello’s metaphor is
appropriate. According to Boria Sax, the term “Holocaust”
originally denoted “a Hebrew sacrifice in which the entire
animal was given to Yahweh to be consumed with fire” (156).8
In a weird twist, a form of animal exploitation—animal killed
for spiritual offering—became the chosen metaphor for the
murder of millions of Jews by the Nazi Germans. The very term
“Holocaust” alludes to and denotes animal suffering. And if
literature seeks to illuminate the human experience and the
ways in which we move through the world, metaphors help
elucidate what lies within us. David Sztybel, a philosopher
specializing in animal ethics, wrote an intriguing essay defending the metaphor of the Holocaust victims to animals in the
meat industry. He claims that in asking if we dare point out “the
chilling similarities between how Jews were treated in the
Holocaust and how animals are treated in the present day” we
are really asking if human beings are of “superior moral
significance relative to nonhuman animals” (98).9 Sztybel’s
selected similarities stand the test: displacement, separation
from family, voicelessness, unfathomable amount of deaths,
namelessness, transported in confined places, and a disowning
of responsibility by the perpetrators, coupled with conditioned
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indifference. This removes the systems of power that we see in
differentiating “man” from “animal” and replaces both with the
identifier of sufferer. And yet, instead of enumerating the
horrors of the meat industry and its procedures, Costello
discusses facts about the Holocaust and leaves it up to those in
attendance to draw the parallels, the very people she earlier
notes whom can only “comprehend the deaths of others” by
thinking of the victims “one at a time” (19).10
Audience members at The Philosophers and the Animals lecture view Elizabeth Costello as removed from society,
entertaining if not completely delusional. She does not really
have much power in effecting change or elevating her audience
to the state of heightened moral awareness that she herself
inhabits because her uncomfortable pauses and alarming
analogies alienate her. Thus, we see a correlation between an
escalated sensitivity to animal abuse and a fall in social status,
as Costello moves from expert to outcast, celebrated to criticized, influential to delusional. An element of attenuated
agency exists within each listener, as they can visually see what
happens to someone who has such an extreme aversion to the
meat industry and its practices—you will be seen as strange,
incoherent, and disorganized.
This begs the question, why did Coetzee make Costello
his protagonist? Why give her such a weak voice, a voice that
lacks gravitas and conviction in making her case against animal
cruelty? An art critic, Ward Jones, argues that the main lesson
of The Lives of Animals is how “the portrait that we have of an
ethical informant” can contribute to the way we evaluate the
argument at hand (209).11 Costello begins her lecture asking her
audience to “concede” to her “the rhetorical power to evoke
these horrors and bring them home to you with adequate force”
which is ironic as she is relatively powerless in evoking a good
10
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response (19).12 Why does Coetzee choose a voice that is
elderly, scattered, and alarmist as the instrument for perpetuating his ideas? I agree with the literature arguing that “fictional
narratives can possess ethical authority” but think that the
choice to make that ethical authority questionable is an ingenious ploy by Coetzee (209).13 Costello’s weak authority and
flaws as a public speaker reflect the thoughts of an author who
knows that his position is trivialized in and disruptive to
popular thought. This shows that Coetzee does not believe
society can recognize the severity or extent of this kind of mass
cruelty and change. He concedes to the moral apathy of humans
and the limited potential for an expansion of human empathy
for animals, as they are non-human and thus other. Coetzee
identifies with the futility of serving as a moral persuader, and
turns to the use of interlocutors to stir the pot for him, to present
ideas that resonate with both the pedagogue and the participant.
Coetzee develops these interlocutors to start a conversation on the concept of cruelty. If pain is a universal sensation
felt, then cruelty inflicted on an animal is just as horrific as
cruelty inflicted on a human. What does it mean to be a conduit
capable of inflicting suffering and cruelty on other living
creatures? It is hard to answer this question because a “uniform
or ubiquitous cross-cultural concept of ‘cruelty’ towards
animals” does not exist (129).14 While global watchdogs for
human rights operate around commonly accepted ideals of
morality and justice, international organizations protecting the
rights of animals find it much harder to make universal claims,
as there is no cross-cultural acceptance of where animals stand
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in relation to humans. But what if we are not in the position of
pain-inflictor, but in the position of pain-witness?
Costello makes it clear that the Germans who “lived in
the countryside” around the Nazi death camps “could not afford
to know” what took place within the camps (19).15 They
rejected a reality that was too painful to accept. But she does
not disparage these people as uniquely immoral—rather, their
actions were reflective of the average German citizen. Camps
covered the Reich like sores. Just as the majority of Americans
live in close proximity to places where meat is produced,
distributed, or sold, Costello argues “few Germans lived more
than a few kilometers from a camp of some kind” (20).16
Evidence of immense cruelty and horror was in the air, swirled
across some pathway of the conscious, even if it could not be
fully explicated or clearly labeled. Costello claims that humans
utilize ignorance as a survival mechanism when faced with
mass-scale suffering. The actions of the Germans behind the
camp were so appalling that the average German citizen needed
to disassociate in order to keep his or her sanity. They chose to
be willfully ignorant.
Costello’s lecture is ultimately an appeal to examine
how human beings sympathize, or refuse to sympathize, with
those they do not identify with, those that remain in the
ambiguous category of other—or, more aptly—nonhuman.
Costello associates willful ignorance with a purposeful refusal
to acknowledge embodied-beings. She claims that merely being
alive “is to be a living soul” (33).17 Thus, animals, a domain
encompassing human beings, all possess embodied souls.
Through her dialogue on embodiment, we see glimpses of
Coetzee’s philosophy emerging. He urges the reader to
acknowledge that the majority of individuals fail to recognize
the capacity of all embodied things to suffer, just as the
fictional lecture attendees fail to recognize the magnitude of
15
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Costello’s argument. Jacques Derrida explores the idea of an
animal’s ability to suffer. If humans are the agents in power,
and they define what is nonhuman, than asking the question,
“Can animals suffer?” is analogous to asking if animals can not
be able to suffer. He further probes, to what extent should we
be concerned with the ability of an animal to suffer, if “being
able to suffer is no longer a power” but a “possibility without
power” (396).18 Would not animals gain superiority over man if
they were unable to suffer? And yet, this cannot be true. And it
is problematic if individuals recognize this capacity to suffer. If
an individual recognizes the capacity of all embodied things—
creatures with a heart and soul—to suffer, then cruelty gains
more weight. Animal cruelty moves from a necessary evil,
something you grimace at but continue to ignore, to a grave
injustice that requires action. Suddenly, the confinement of
animals stuffed into boxes, pens, coops, and cages becomes as
glaringly offensive as the confinement of humans in cattle cars.
I want to extend Coetzee’s thinking and propose that
Costello misses something crucial by making this a binary
response—sympathizing or refusing to sympathize. A variety of
obstacles to human sympathy for suffering exist: not knowing,
willfully not knowing (as Costello highlights), compassion
fatigue (the inability to invest the tremendous emotional energy
that sympathy requires for every injustice), and apathy from the
feeling of impotence in the face of overwhelming injustice or
cruelty. Therefore, a lack of sympathy is not always a psychological defense on behalf of the person witnessing suffering. I
believe people consciously or unconsciously place their
psychological suffering on one scale with the ethical behavior
they wish they could exhibit on the other scale. The scale tips
towards the heavier desire. By ignoring all of these nuances,
Costello simplifies the problem of animal cruelty to a point that
can be easily dismissed by her audience. They perceive her
points as both radical and irrelevant. This failure on Costello’s
part makes me question Coetzee’s viewpoint, as he created
18
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Costello’s failure. Perhaps if we can recognize the earnestness
in which Costello believes her moral knowledge to be true, we
can also empathize with the frustration of a fruitless mission
and the inability to will a group to action. And yet, identifying
with Costello proves exceedingly challenging.
Costello’s Holocaust metaphor, if it is to be viewed as a
vehicle for illuminating commonalities, serves its purpose by
highlighting a lack of sympathy for living beings deemed
“nonhuman.” Psychologists studying anthropomorphism
elucidate this idea of nonhuman versus human by putting
humanness on a continuum. They claim that through anthropomorphism “individuals can attribute humanlike capacities to
nonhuman agents” and through dehumanization they can also
“fail to attribute these same capacities to other people” (228).19
While the former mode leads to more moral concern for the
subject, the latter incites moral detachment. This process makes
it easier to excuse immoral actions. Costello’s lecture discomfits her audience not just because it centers on an analogy to the
Holocaust, but because it suggests that human cruelty towards
other humans is no worse than human cruelty towards animals.
It is easy for us to see “animality in humans,” as most people
regard Nazi leaders in the Holocaust as morally repugnant and
thus bestial, but it is harder for us to see the “humanity in
animals” when this means an integral part of our everyday
lives—eating meat—is rooted in the suffering of fellow
creatures (130).20
Towards the end of her lecture, Costello returns to the
death camps to discuss the true horror of the Holocaust—the
inability of the German perpetrators to “think themselves into

19

A. Waytz, J. Cacioppo, and N. Epley, “Who Sees Human?: The
Stability and Importance of Individual Differences in Anthropomorphism,” Perspectives on Psychological Science 5 (2010): 228.
20
Fuentes, “The Humanity of Animals and the Animality of Humans:
A View From Biological Anthropology Inspired by J. M. Coetzee’s
‘Elizabeth Costello,’” 130.

37

Furman Humanities Review
the place of their victims” that rattle away in a cattle-car (34).21
Just as the majority of Germans “closed their hearts” to the
faculty of sympathy, so does Costello’s audience fail to imagine
themselves in the body of Costello (34).22 Her own son, whose
thoughts Coetzee brings us into, thinks her lecture was a
“strange talk” both “ill gauged” and “ill argued” (36).23 He
believes she should not be there. Norma, his wife, wants to
publicly humiliate Costello by asking a malevolent question.
Costello calls for sympathy, yet we see Coetzee’s two main
characters deny her compassion. Her appeal is fruitless.
Just as the audience fails to sympathize with the speaker, so
I believe that Coetzee satirizes the proclivity of humans to cling
to ignorance rather than move to action. Costello claims that
“there are people who have the capacity to imagine themselves
as someone else” but the overwhelming majority of people
“have the capacity but choose not to exercise it” (35).24 Humans
will choose being accepted over being ostracized, even if the
choice compromises moral norms. History, as seen through the
Holocaust analogy, continues to prove that those who challenge
the status quo face ostracism while the ignorant remain safe in
their country homes. Nazi rhetoric encouraged people to reject
identifying with Jews. We are similarly conditioned to be
entirely indifferent to animal suffering as it has become an
integral part of our society, and those who reject it are cast out
as pariahs.
Coetzee proffers an indictment on Elizabeth Costello to the
reader as well. She alienates herself from her audience through
her morally superior attitude, seen in moments when she claims
that she can think her way “into the existence of a bat or a
chimpanzee or an oyster” because they “share the substrate of
life” with her (35).25 She posits herself as a witness to a
21
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holocaust who refuses to remain silent, rendering her audience
members the German people of the countryside who witness
horror and choose willful ignorance. She claims that “each day
is a new holocaust” and yet “our moral being [remains]
untouched” and we do not “feel tainted” (35).26 Costello makes
each new day a harbinger of horrific tragedy. Each day is a new
holocaust. And each day, we shield our morality from affront,
to the point where we are inoculated against the brutality. She
suggests that her audience members are tainted—an affront to
each member’s moral code that she herself evades.
In Costello’s voice and actions, we see Coetzee the author posing the question: Does individual awareness bring
about any real change, especially if she or he takes an extremely isolating stance? There is power in his subtlety of narrative
authority, and Coetzee’s prose reflects an acute awareness of
the inherent animal suffering in the meat industry. His vision
for audience response, both the fictional audience receiving
Costello and the real audience of readers, is bleak—he packages a story in a lecture in which the majority of characters cannot
change their mindsets or expand their perspectives. Beyond
that, the individual is relatively weak in her power to effect
change, especially because Costello’s main arguments remain
rooted in a metaphor that links the meat industry to a dark,
indisputably incomprehensible moment in human history. We
think we have already been morally aroused after the horrors of
the Holocaust, and that suffering of that magnitude cannot
possibly be repeated. But just as incidents of genocide took
place before World War II with the Armenians of the Ottoman
Empire, and subsequently persisted throughout the twentieth
century in Cambodia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Rwanda, so do
grave injustices against living creatures exist in the present day.
The lecture ends abruptly: “We can do anything and get
away with it… there is no punishment” (25).27 But is not the
calculated cruelty of a few at the top of the meat industry worse
26
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than the willful ignorance assumed by the majority of human
beings towards animal cruelty? Coetzee’s fictional scaffolding
around the subject of animal cruelty in the meat industry allows
for an inward turn; which character acts in a way I would? The
reader is privy to the scene but not participating in it. You are
not tasked with gauging your reaction because you are not
acting—you are watching. It is almost as if Coetzee presents
you with the choice between kindness and cruelty itself,
knowing you will guiltily choose the latter, but from afar. You
have the privilege of choosing from a private locale, away from
the fictional group of people in attendance. He knows you will
not change your perspective, even if a tinge of guilt leaks into
your conscious. While we do not hold the knives that slit the
throats of chickens nor press the buttons that systematically
asphyxiate cattle, we do not question how our meat reaches our
plates as perfectly symmetrical patties. When activism presses
up against alienation, humans usually choose the status quo, if
for nothing more than self-preservation. We willfully ignore the
suffering of those whom we cannot identify with, feeling
morally exempt from a murder we did not commit. For being
the animals in power, humans are quite powerless in effecting
change.
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